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SECURING EFFECTIVE WORK FROM LABOR
There is probably no more pressing and important managerial
problem today, than the securing of effective work from labor.
This article presents a review of a seasoned incentive wage system
which has produced satisfactory results. The system is being
operated by a concern employing at times over five thousand
workers in three plants. The beneficial results obtained from its
use have been increased production, decreased costs and higher
wages.
Many managers have so abused some wage incentive systems
that the term “ sweat-shop methods” for a long time has been used
as a slogan by those workers who are opposed to any method of
wage payment except day-work. Before the beginning of our last
period of prosperity, scientific time study and rate setting were
not rare, but in the opinion of many students of industrial manage
ment they were used almost entirely for the benefit of the owners
with very little consideration for workers.
Today, in the successful business, the co-operative spirit must
prevail. The stockholder or capitalist, the executive and the worker
should be compensated according to the services they render. The
value of their services should be based upon economies effected, and
standards of ability. The standards should be established fairly
and equitably. The stockholder who has invested his capital ex
pects, and should receive, a fair return. The executive who plans
and effects savings so that the stockholder will receive his divi
dends, should share in the economies he has helped to make. The
employee, who by steady application and skill, increases production,
reduces cost and automatically increases profits, should be rewarded
in the proportion that his performance is to a standard or normal
worker’s performance. The average employee will not contribute
his best efforts unless he has a chance of being suitably compen
sated.
While many profit-sharing methods are in use, it is almost im
possible to make a fair division of profits, considering the effort and
accomplishment of each worker as compared with his fellowworker. Exceptionally efficient workers are apt to feel that they
do not receive an equitable share in the profits in comparison with
less skillful workers.
In the matter of wages it is the fairest method to compensate
workers in proportion to their value as individuals. A company
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should make it worth while for the worker to produce to the extent
of his ability, by recognizing his individuality through paying him
for his achievements, as compared to the accomplishments of his
fellow-workers. In this connection a standard should be set that
the worker can reach and pass. Thus, if George Smith is naturally
quicker and a better worker than Harry Rowe, then George should
first be hourly rated higher than Harry, and should be rewarded
by receiving extra remuneration, based upon the difference in time
between Harry’s elapsed time on the job and his own. This differ
ence, plus his margin of hourly rate, represents George’s superi
ority as a worker. His additional monetary reward is the elapsed
time difference multiplied by his hourly rate. In this case, Harry
Rowe’s rate represents the standard, or 100% rate, which is the
basis of the efficiency ratings in the plants under consideration
which are later explained in this article.
C h o o s in g

th e

I n c e n t iv e S y s t e m

No unanimity of opinion exists as to which incentive wage
system is generally the fairest and most satisfactory to the worker
and at the same time nets the owners the greatest saving, consider
ing the additional overhead expense necessary to run an incentive
system.
Workers usually have an aversion to straight piece work.
Changing rates with the changes in the labor market is difficult.
If the wages in the labor market increase considerably, it is neces
sary to revise all wage rates in fairness to the workers. On the
other hand, if market wage rates decrease greatly, straight piece
work rates should be revised downward in justice to the owners.
It is self-evident that rates of pay must be sufficient to reward
the worker, equal to what he can get elsewhere where working con
ditions are similar, and sufficiently high enough to encourage him
to make a special effort.
One very serious objection to straight piece work is that the
rates are too inflexible, and consequently unjust to owners and
workers when conditions change from what they were when the
rates were set, unless the rates are revised to meet existing condi
tions. An attempt to change rates to meet changes in the labor
market is costly and difficult. Furthermore, it takes considerable
time.
It takes a very short time, however, to create a dissatisfied
organization. If a worker thinks injustice has been done, it is
always magnified by other interested parties.
Other conditions which more or less affect the wages of
workers on straight piece work are the interferences caused by the
variations in the “ machinability” qualities of materials and the
necessity of putting the product through machines which are not
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the most suitable for the work in hand. In periods of high produc
tion these interferences with the regular routine are sometimes
necessary in order to maintain the schedule of production and to
balance output.
One incentive wage system used by the concern under consid
eration is a guaranteed hourly rate with full allowance for time
saved. This system is called “time work.” In order to use the
method time studies are made and the best possible time is deter
mined. To this best possible time is added 25% and the result is
termed “ allowed time” or “ standard 100% time.” Allowed time is
set on every operation in terms of hundredths of hours per piece,
and if the work is completed in less than the allowed time, the
worker gains the entire difference between allowed time and actual
time. If he meets with difficulties, or is not efficient enough to
better the allowed time, he receives only his hourly rate. This
method is obviously fair to the worker and to the company, the
latter benefitting through increased production. The formula used
for ascertaining the worker’s efficiency is allowed time divided by
actual time. A worker who equals the allowed time is 100% effi
cient, but earns no extra pay. A worker who equals the best pos
sible time earns an extra 25% of his hourly rate, and is rated as
125% efficient. A worker who betters the best possible time earns
as extra compensation, an extra 25% plus the difference between
allowed time and actual time, multiplied by his hourly rate. A
worker who fails to meet the allowed time earns as much as the
worker who equals it, since his hourly rate is guaranteed, but his
efficienecy per cent. would show below 100 and his services would
be dispensed with after he has received a sufficient number of low
rankings in efficienecy. Hence, it is apparent that eventually only
100% men or better would be employed if this system is strictly
adhered to.
While the worker, under the wage system being described, who
falls a little below 100% undoubtedly reduces costs, since he has
made more of an endeavor to meet or better the allowed time than
he did when there was no incentive, nevertheless, he earns no more
than he had previously earned and his rating of less than 100%
results in the company having a production shortage which is
shown on a production shortage report. As a result additional
work or overtime is necessary in order to keep production up to
schedule.
The following table shows hypothetical performances o f four
workers rated at 50 cents per hour and illustrates the workings of
the features of the wage system just discussed.
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B

A
Best possible time
A llow ed time
Actual time
V
Tim e saved
E xtra earnings
Best possible time
A llow ed time
A ctual time
Tim e saved
Extra earnings
Total allowed time
Total actual time
H ourly earnings
T otal time saved
T otal extra earnings
T otal 8 -h.our earnings
Efficiency per cent

6 .40 Hrs.
8.0 0
8.0 0

J ob

8.0 0

“
“

0

2.00

Job
8 .0 0 Hrs.
8.0 0

“

6 .4 0 “
1.60 “
$ .80
1.60 Hrs.

$ .0 0

8.0 0

“

$4.00

.0 0

2 .0 0
$1 .0 0

0

$4.00

$5.00
125%

100%

“

1 .60 “
.40 “
$ .20
10.00 Hrs.

$4.00

D

C

6 .4 0 Hrs.

“
“

6 .4 0 Hrs.
8.0 0

“

5 .0 0 “
3 .0 0 “
$1.50
3 .8 4 Hrs.
4 .8 0 “
3 .0 0 “
1 .80 “
$ .90
12.80 Hrs.
8.0 0

$4.00
4 .8 0
$2.40
$6.40
160%

“

6 .40 Hrs.
8.0 0

10.00

“

“

8 .0 0 Hrs.

10.00

“

$4.00
“

$4 . 6 6
80%

These four workers, A, B, C and D in the above table, are given
similar jobs with the same allowed time. “ A ” finishes his task in
the time allowed. Neither he nor the company gains or loses.
According to the rating he is 100% efficient. “ B” completes his
task in the best possible time and earns 25% over his hourly rate
and uses the time saved to make an additional 25% on another job.
He is 125% efficient. “ C” accomplishes more than “ B” . He sur
passes the best possible tim e; earns 60% more than his hourly rate
and continues to earn as much additional on his second job. He is
160% efficient. “ D” takes 10 hours to do what “ A ” has in 8, “ B”
has in 6.40 and “ C” has in 5 hours. He is but 80% efficient.
W

age

A

g reem en t

Before starting an incentive system of this description, the
following agreement should be understood by the employees and
rigidly adhered to by the company. Rates are set through scien
tific time study with a view of allowing the worker the entire time
saved between the allowed time (standard 100% time) and the
actual time, the worker having the privilege of receiving a demon
stration showing that the allowed time is attainable. A standard
or allowed time rate once set and approved is not to be altered for
a year, unless changes in tools or equipment are made. Further
more, the rate is not to be changed under the latter conditions if
the employee is responsible for or suggests an improvement in tools
or tooling.
As a penalty for doing the work incorrectly the worker receives
credit for only good parts which pass working drawing inspection.
In order that a worker’s record of performance may be made
comparative and his ability and individuality easily recognized, an
efficiency record must be kept of each job. A daily, weekly or
monthly spoiled work deficiency record, an attendance efficiency
record, and a deportment deficiency record and a tardiness defi
ciency record, respectively, are also maintained.
R

ate

S e t t in g

The success of the incentive system described in this article
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depends upon the setting of reliable standards and the desire of the
worker to increase his earnings. He must be convinced at first
that he has a good chance to better the standard, which must be
set by someone fully qualified for this important work.
It is extremely important that the rate setter must be a good
all-around mechanic and familiar with all types of machine tools.
He must have the interest of the company at heart and yet be so
tactful that he does not acquire the enmity of the worker. He must
be a good judge of human nature and character, and be cool and
courteous. He must be able to personally demonstrate that his
allowed time is fair and can be surpassed by himself. He should
also be able to detect the slightest movement of the worker made
for the purpose of tricking him when making time studies. There
are mechanics who know of many tricks which will fool the rate
setter unless he is wide awake and thereby obtain a greater allowed
time. Therefore, care must be taken in timing an operation per
formed by the worker.
After several time studies have been made, checked and re
checked, the allowed time is set and approved by the production
superintendent and recorded on a standard operation write-up
sheet. This sheet shows the part number, operation numbers, the
routine of the movements of the material, the type of machines upon
which the operations are to be performed, the allowed time per
operation, the description of the movements necessary to perform
the work, the kind and numbers of the tools and gauges used in per
forming and measuring the work and the feeds and speeds.
N e c e s s it y

of

G ood I n s p e c t i o n

and

T im

e
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Operation inspectors are employed in each department and are
responsible for the passing of good materials and the recording of
daily production records and spoiled work reports. The daily pro
duction record is a report which shows the daily accomplishment of
every employee working under the incentive system. It shows the
employee’s name, shop order, part number and operation, the quan
tity produced, allowed time per piece, total allowed time, actual
time, time saved, the efficiency percentage and the result of inspec
tion both as to quantity good and quantity spoiled.
Operation inspection expense is the largest portion of over
head expense necessary to maintain the time work system, but it
has been demonstrated that it pays for itself many times, by elimi
nating labor on parts actually spoiled, the defects of which would
otherwise not be discovered until a final inspection were made. For
example, there are several parts such as cylinders, crankcases, cam
shafts and crankshafts, used on automobiles which have many
varied operations. If a part is spoiled on one of the first operations
and not discovered at once, the succeeding operations are wasted.
The value of this lost labor amounts to considerably more than the
extra cost of operation inspection.

7

The routine of the operations, as well as the amount of inspec
tion necessary, is predetermined by the planning department.
Each department has a time clerk who is responsible for the
count of the parts, as well as the ringing in by workers on the time
clock at the start of jobs and the ringing out at the completion of
jobs. It is quite necessary that a foreman or a time clerk inspect
each job at the time the job ticket is punched “ in” to make sure
the work has not been started, and it is necessary to inspect the
work again when the job ticket is punched “ out” . Unless each
order is checked at the start and finish it is possible for a worker,
if he punches his own job card, to report more time on one job than
he should and less on another which he might do, since he may be
exceptionally efficient on one class of work and not as skillful on
another kind. The following is an example of manipulated time in
the case of a worker rated at 50 cents per hour:
A llow ed
Time
Job 1
Job 2
T otal

8 .0 0 Hrs.
“
16.00 “

8.00

Correct
Actual
Tim e
7.80 Hrs.
5.20 “
13.00 “

False
Actual
Tim e
8 .5 0 H rs.
4 .5 0 “
13.00 “

Correct
Tim e
Saved
.20 Hrs.
2 .8 0 “
3.00 “

Correct False Correct False
Effi
Extra Effi
Extra
Earning Earning ciency ciency

False
Tim e
Saved
3.50 H rs.
3.50 “

$ .10
1.40
1.50

$1.75
1.75

103%
154%
123%

94%
178%

A manipulation of job cards with the above result would not
net the worker any considerable amount of extra earnings unless
he had two work-orders, both lasting over a period of several days.
He could not work this scheme very often on small orders because
it would result in too many low efficiency performances, and the
employees realize they cannot consistently have less than 100%
ratings and retain their jobs. The example is shown to illustrate
the necessity of protection against the manipulation of time, par
ticularly in cases where an incentive system of this kind is started.
Before the workers have had the advantage of the time study man’s
instructions, regarding movements and lost motion, low efficiency
is natural and should be allowed for during the rudimentary stage
of development.
Another duty of the time clerk is to make sure that the number
of pieces sent into the department correspond with the quantity
called for on the production order routing card, and that the total
number of parts rejected as defective, incorrect and spoiled, plus
the quantity of good parts, agrees with the total originally received
in the department. He is also responsible for checking the quan
tities on job cards with quantities on the daily production record
and the daily inspection report. The latter is a summary of each
day’s inspection, showing good pieces passed, bad pieces rejected,
and the reasons for rejection.
D a il y U

se of th e

E

f f ic ie n c y
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The daily production record which discloses each worker’s effi
ciency and spoilage on each operation is in the hands of the produc
tion superintendent and the department foremen by noon on the
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day following the workers’ performances. The workers with less
than 100% performance are asked for an explanation regarding
their failure to do the work within the allowed time. Their excuses
are recorded and future performances are checked with these ex
planations. The reasons given by the workers sometimes reveal
conditions which may never be discovered in any other manner.
They may show that machines or fixtures are slightly out of order,
perhaps not enough to spoil the parts being machined, but enough
to retard production and to cause so much extra concentration on
the operation that the movements which count the most are lost.
No attention would be given by the worker to such a condition, if
he were paid on day work basis, where he had no particular incen
tive for increased production.
The writer recollects an excuse which was given by a worker
for spoiling some cylinders. The spoilage, while not particularly
large in any one day, was occurring constantly. Almost every day
there was at least one cylinder spoiled on a boring operation. The
workman stated that the jig was at fault. The foreman declared
that only the man was to blame. The foreman made but a casual
check of the jig, which showed nothing wrong. An investigation and
study of the operation by the time study man and a careful check
o f the jig by a tool inspector brought out the fact that the worker’s
contention was right. One of the clamping bolts was slightly worn
but not enough to cause spoiled work, if enough pressure were used
in tightening. Occasionally, the worker did not put this extra pres
sure on the clamping bolt and the result was a scrap cylinder. The
worker’s excuse in this instance, led to the designing and making of
a better jig which paid for itself within a month by stopping the
spoilage. It is apparent, therefore, that the workers’ excuses at
times furnish the means for correcting faults. Another worker
claimed that there was too much excess stock on castings. This
fault was easily remedied by having the foundry change the pat
terns. The saving here is obvious.
The performances of workers who show less than 100% effi
ciency are carefully checked each day. They are given every chance
to meet the allowed time and if they are habitually inefficient, they
are tried on other work. If they then fail, they are dismissed. The
success of the methods being discussed depends upon having better
than 100% men in the shops, for they are then making above the
market labor rate and are satisfied, and the company is at least pro
ducing the minimum quantity scheduled. Men who continually
range from 100 to 110%, when it is known that they could rate
themselves higher, are studied carefully. They are usually the
dubious ones who are wary of going the limit, fearing cuts in
allowed time. These men have to be convinced that the company
will rigidly carry out the wage rate agreement regarding cutting
allowed time. When once satisfied that the company is honest in its
own purpose, little further trouble with those workers is experi
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enced. Special study is also given to workers who consistenly rank
high in efficienecy. They are shifted to other jobs and tried out in
many ways with the view of promoting them to foremanships. If
they are very efficient on all classes of work, they may be just the
men the company wants as foremen, to instruct workers how to
attain greater production.
L

abor

on
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ork

and
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When an operation inspector discovers work which is spoiled
to the extent that it cannot be saved without additional operations
being performed on it, he issues a spoiled work slip which shows the
worker’s number, and then records his own number and signature
on the slip. After the spoilage has been recorded on the daily
inspection report, daily production record and routing card, respec
tively, the spoiled work slip is sent to the factory accounting depart
ment where the total time saved is reduced by the number of pieces
spoiled times the actual time per piece. The worker, therefore,
receives extra earnings only for those parts which are good. At
times, parts do not pass inspection, but they may be made to pass
the limits set with a slight additional operation. Such parts are
called incorrect material and the worker is allowed to correct the
parts on his own time by having this operation considered as part
of his actual time. If the parts are found to be defective during
machining, that is, if castings have blow holes or forgings are
spotty, which are purely material defects and no fault of the ma
chinist, and if the operation is completed before the defect is dis
covered, the worker receives credit for the labor performed since
it would be unfair to make him stand the burden of something be
yond his control.
U

se

of
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f f ic ie n c y
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The method of determining proper hourly rates (hiring rates)
is to divide the workers into three classes, A, B, and C with a mini
mum and a maximum rate in each class.
In the chucking department where the machine tools used con
sist of automatic and semi-automatic chucking machines, the classes
and ratings might be as follows:
Class A
Rate per H ou r
M inimum-Maximum
Jones and Lamson Operators
Libby
Gisholt
Potter and Johnson
New Britain
A cm e
Bullard

36
36
44
36
44
36
44

Class B
Rate per H our
M inim um -Maxim um
29
29
34
29
34
29
34

48
48
55
48
55
48
55

35
35
43
35
43
35
43

Class C
Rate per H our
M inimum-Maximum
23
23
28
23
28
23
28

28
28
33
28
33
28
33

The figures are fictitious, but they show the basis of rating.
Class C men on Jones and Lamson Chucking Machines would be
rated from 23 to 28 cents per hour; class B men from 29 to 35 cents;
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and class A men from 36 to 48 cents, depending upon their effi
ciency in the respective classes. A worker’s rate is increased in his
class or the man is promoted to another class, according to the
progress he has made, based on results as shown on his efficiency
and deficiency records, consideration being given to attendance,
efficiency, deportment, spoiled work and tardiness deficiency as
well as production efficiency.
When a worker’s records, and observations of him, indicate
that he is not attaining the standards set, he is given three warn
ings that unless he shows improvement, he will be demoted to an
other class or will have to accept a decrease in his wage rate in his
present class. After the third warning, if no improvement is
shown, he is advised of his demotion. In very few cases are more
than one or two warnings necessary, for it is self-evident to the
man that the company has an accurate check on his movements and
performances, and he may realize that the only way he can obtain
his reward is by strenuous and earnest labor. In cases where an
application for an increase in a wage rate is made, the records are
carefully studied and if no increase is warranted, the employee is
advised as to the reason which is plainly evident on the efficiency
and deficiency records. Very few requests for wage increases are
received from employees, however, since each worker is auto
matically increased in rate and class from his record of individual
performances. In other words, his efforts are recorded and re
warded automatically and he is not lost sight of. The procedure in
use in many plants, today, is to raise individual rates at different
times upon the foreman’s recommendation. This was the practice
in the plants under consideration before the present incentive sys
tem was established. At one time it was desirable to make a gen
eral increase of rates. The employees’ record cards were carefully
checked and it was discovered that there were good workmen who
had been with the company a long time, whose rates had not been
increased in three years, while some of their fellow-workers had
received advances several times during that period. It was appar
ent that the foreman had perhaps deliberately failed to recommend
these men.
The following description of an actual occurrence will show
the fairness of keeping employees’ performance records. A fore
man made out and forwarded to the employment manager a request
for discharge for one of his men, giving as reasons “ spoiling too
much work” and “ too much absence from work.” Reference to the
employee’s records showed that his spoiled work deficiency was
practically nothing and that he had lost no time in several months.
The foreman’s request for discharge was refused and he was ad
vised that dishonesty of this kind would not be tolerated. This
foreman wanted to be boss and to discharge those men who did not
come up to certain personal standards which he had set. He was
soon convinced that the man’s individual performances were the
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first consideration and requests for discharges had to have a basic
reason, which would stand investigation.
U

se of
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f f ic ie n c y
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Regardless of how much it hurts to lay off some workers it is
necessary in times like the present to shut our eyes to sentiment and
reduce the force. Obviously the ones retained should consist of
those who are faithful, loyal and most efficient. How many firms
employing large numbers of workmen can conscientiously state
that they have kept their best men ? They cannot be sure without
an intimate knowledge of each individual’s achievements. Prob
ably the most common method used in reducing the force is to ask
the foreman for a list of the men whose services in his opinion,
could most easily be spared. It is undoubtedly true that there are
many cases of worthy men who have been discharged on account of
the antipathy of foremen. The workmen may have lacked tact and
did not hesitate to show their disdain of the head of the depart
ment. An employee may be independent or sensitive and go about
his work without kowtowing to his foreman who may resent an
independent spirit. Yet such a worker may be one of the most
efficient and valuable men in the shop. Nevertheless, his is liable
to be the first name on a foreman’s list of men to be laid off. How
much fairer it is to both the workmen and the company to have the
factory manager consider each man from the employee’s record of
production, attendance, deportment, spoiled work and tardiness.
Certainly the high efficiency men have helped to make the company
successful. They should be retained as a reward for giving their
best service and allowances should be made for temperament.
The workers who rank high and average best should form the
nucleus of the larger organization that will be necessary when busi
ness becomes normal again. Performance records should be re
ferred to when business does increase, and when it becomes neces
sary to employ more workers, the company will want to re-hire
those employees who ranked highest when they were laid off. It is
more satisfactory to refer to “ past performances” and to read the
whole story than it is to consider several hundred men whose only
ratings are recorded as first class, good or fair, those classifications
perhaps having been made by a prejudiced foreman. How much
better is one man than another who is rated good ? Perhaps it can
not be determined except from the foreman’s memory. This
method is not wholly reliable.
Generally speaking, managers have not given as much atten
tion to the quality of workmen as they have to the quality of their
tools. Before buying tool steel they insist on knowing the contents of
carbon, manganese, silicon, phosphorus and sulphur, and the elastic
limit, tensile strength, elongation, contraction and schleroscope
hardness of the steel. Yet all that they know of the human being
working with this steel, is that he is rated by his foreman as first
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class, good, fair or poor. A manager should know the varying
efficiency ratings of all of these different classes of men, who should
be analyzed as carefully and as positively as their tools are specified
and inspected.
This paper may be interpreted as an appeal for justice to the
worker which is not its purpose. Justice is impartial and means
fairness to both workers and owners. It depends largely on co
operation. The writer realizes, however, that co-operation does not
mean only a union between the executives and the heads of the
departments, but that it must be a union between the officials, the
foremen and the largest unit of the organization— the workers— if
success is to be assured. To attain that co-operation, rewards com
mensurate with a man’s individual achievements as compared with
the performances of his fellow workers must be paid.
The reader is asked to put himself in the shop-worker’s place.
Acknowledge that he has all the aspirations to succeed that you
have. Give him credit for being intelligent and of good education,
as most skilled mechanics are. Then consider what you would do
among hundreds of co-workers, on a day or hourly rate, with no
chance to show your superiority as a mechanic. Would you strive?
Perhaps you would for a time until you became disheartened and
were convinced that your fellow-workers knew what they were
talking about, when they quietly told you that it was useless to
work harder than they did, as there was no personal reward for it,
and that there was only one chance in a thousand of being recog
nized for it. If, after months and years of extreme effort no recog
nition came, other than your rating as a first-class worker, would
you continue to strive? You would be convinced that the easiest
way was the best, and you would admit that there was no incen
tive to keep on. Your efficiency would drop off and you would join
the rest of your co-workers in the “ Society of Discontent” or the
“ Apathy Club.” But, suppose you were advised that you would be
paid on the basis of the time you saved for the company. Would
you still continue to plod along? No, for your ambition would be
stimulated. You would have something to work and compete for
and the harder you worked the greater the reward you would re
ceive. You would be happy in knowing that you received pay for
what you individually accomplished, not on the principle of being a
first-class worker, along with hundreds of other first-class workers,
who were rated neither better nor worse than you. The spirit of
rivalry would be re-established and you would feel that you could
be a success in your own particular work where you had failed
before.
The methods of securing effective work from labor as outlined
in this article cannot be carried out unless workers are recognized
and rewarded as individuals. Grouping labor according to hourly
ratings is proper for a basis, provided that there are enough groups
or classifications, as illustrated by the tables, shown under the
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heading “ Use of Efficiency Records in Normal Times.” An incen
tive must be established which is based upon a standard of time,
and all time saved should be credited to the workers. Performances
must be recorded promptly. The entire method must be on a foun
dation of fairness to both the company and the employee. As a
result the company will have boosters, happy workers, permanent
efficiency, and the workers will receive permanent earnings above
the labor market rate.
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